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Introduction 
Michael Radich and Chen-kuo Lin  
The title of this book, A Distant Mirror, ultimately refers back to Barbara 
Tuchman’s work of the same title on the history of fourteenth-century 
Europe (Tuchman, 1978). Tuchman uses this evocative phrase to convey 
her claim that the fourteenth century can be read as reflecting the 
twentieth century, and thus, more broadly, to evoke the idea that the 
study of history can be a kind of study, by reflection, of ourselves. 
However, although we gratefully acknowledge our debt to Tuchman for 
the phrase, we do not intend it to have this connotation. We are alluding 
to a more proximate model.  
In her A Few Good Men, Jan Nattier borrows Tuchman’s phrase to refer 
to the problem of investigating the contents of Indian Buddhism through 
Chinese (and Tibetan) translations of Buddhist texts.1 In borrowing the 
title from Nattier in turn, then, we intend both to generalise the prob-
lematic Nattier points to, and to problematise it further. Nattier herself 
does not discuss the problem of views on Indian Buddhism that might be 
obtained through other dimensions of the Chinese tradition, including 
topics investigated in the present volume, such as: the independent crea-
tive thought of Chinese Buddhist thinkers; or the possibility that Chinese 
reports might be accurately based upon information obtained through 
extra-textual channels like oral reports. However, we do use the phrase 
in this considerably extended sense. We intend our title to encapsulate a 
methodological intuition, which we believe runs as a common thread 
through almost all of the studies collected here – that scholars should 
-------------------------------------------------- 
1 Nattier, 2003: 70-72, “A Distant Mirror: Studying Indian Buddhism through Chinese and 
Tibetan Texts.” 
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seriously consider the possibility that a wider set of features of the 
Chinese tradition, treated carefully, might serve us as a “distant mirror”, 
accurately displaying features common to Buddhism in India and 
elsewhere outside China.  
In other words, the studies in this volume typically set out to explore, 
in some detailed case, the possibility that even where Chinese Buddhism 
appears in some respect or degree to depart from what we know of its 
Indian counterparts, Chinese developments might still in some ways in-
form us about “genuine” Buddhism (to use a dangerous turn of phrase), 
rather than representing mere distortions of, or departures from, an 
Indian gold standard.  
The counterpart and foil to this view, of course, is a simplistic under-
standing of Chinese Buddhism as a product of so-called “sinification”, or 
“making Chinese”, which, at a hypothetical extreme (which may not be 
fully realized in any actual scholarship), sees Indian Buddhism as a norm; 
any difference between Chinese and Indian Buddhism is read as a failure 
in China to approximate that Indian norm, often under the pressure of 
distinctive presuppositions, ideas and tendencies endemic to and charac-
teristic of Chinese culture as a whole. 
Of course, this is no simple matter, and we do not mean to deny that 
Buddhism did indeed change greatly in the complex transition from its 
Indian (and other) points of origin into China. Indeed, the real challenge 
for any full consideration of the overall formation and character of Chi-
nese Buddhism (an ambitious project we do not pretend to essay here) 
would be to balance the treatment of Chinese Buddhism as “a distant 
mirror” with the problematic encapsulated by the notion of “sinification” 
in its broad sense. Fortuitously, in fact, this opposite interpretation of 
Chinese developments and evidence has also been expressed through 
another variation on the conceit of the mirror. To borrow a phrase from 
a forceful argument by Gregory Schopen (without implying that this is 
entirely what Schopen meant), we must also consider the possibility that 
rather than furnishing us with a clear if distant “mirror” for Buddhism in 
India (and at large), Chinese evidence gives us a view “through a Chinese 
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looking-glass”.2 By this apt and wry allusion to Lewis Carroll (Carroll, 
1871), Schopen suggests the troubling possibility that Chinese evidence 
might present us with mere caricatures, bordering on the satirical, of the 
Indian Buddhism it represents, and perhaps, that only a fool would 
mistake this image for sober reality. 
In the article in which he speaks of the “Chinese looking-glass”, Scho-
pen makes a very strong point, and we certainly would not deny his con-
clusions or ignore his prudent warning. Chinese evidence must be used 
with great care if it is to lead us to any reliable conclusions about Indian 
Buddhism; and historically, the field has sometimes gone astray through 
simplistic, insufficiently rigorous use of Chinese evidence. The studies in 
the present collection, however, tend to focus on, and work to correct, 
an equally salient, opposite type of methodological error. At the same 
time that Chinese evidence has sometimes been regarded as too directly 
reflecting Indian developments, on other occasions, scholars can too 
hastily conclude (and have concluded) that developments in China must 
be unique and parochial, and thereby overlook ways that Chinese evi-
dence might reflect, even if distantly and indirectly, important features 
of Buddhism that also held beyond Chinese borders. The studies gath-
ered here attempt in various ways to correct this bias. 
Perhaps the most significant sense in which the present studies treat 
Chinese evidence as capable of teaching us new things about Indian sys-
tems is in considering the ideas of Chinese authors and thinkers as inde-
pendent or alternate developments, equally valid, of ideas and systems 
-------------------------------------------------- 
2 Schopen, 2000. The argument Schopen advances under this title is more specific than 
the very general problematic we discuss here – in brief, that in the history of Buddhist 
scholarship, excessive and methodologically naive reliance on various kinds of Chinese 
evidence has produced a distorted picture of Indian Buddhism between the beginning 
of the Common Era and the fifth/sixth centuries, which exaggerates the centrality of 
“the” Mahāyāna.  
Incidentally, it seems that Schopen and Nattier conceived independently of these dif-
ferent takes on the conceit of China as mirror: Schopen published his paper too early to 
be responding to Nattier (2003); but Nattier used her title before Schopen (2000) 
appeared, in unpublished talks and papers which were eventually worked into her book 
(Nattier, personal communication). 
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also known in India. Various contributors explore this approach in 
different ways. 
For example, Chen-kuo Lin’s study employs the novel strategy of put-
ting Jingying Huiyuan and Dignāga side by side, as two roughly contem-
poraneous Buddhist thinkers, inheriting and working out different 
consequences from a similar body of material (with due allowance, in the 
case of Huiyuan, for differences of both selection and nuance condi-
tioned by the process of translation from Indic sources). Both the Indian 
and the Chinese thinker alike are regarded as creative individuals, work-
ing out different possible responses to a common inherited problematic. 
On this approach, the Chinese alternative, instead of merely “failing to 
be Indian”, can be seen, rather, as representing alternate possibilities im-
plicit within the common stock of Buddhist tradition – as exploring a 
“path not taken” in India, perhaps. In the reflected light of this approach, 
we might even appreciate anew the creative energy of the Indian tra-
dition itself, instead of misperceiving it as plotting the only possible line 
of development from its historical roots and premises. 
Similarly, Shinya Moriyama examines Xuanzang and Kuiji’s theories 
of the fallacy known as viruddhāvyabhicārin, as instances of alternative 
lines of development from the same premises as the Indian system. That 
is to say, he too treats the Chinese thinkers as having pursued lines of 
development possible in the system of Dignāga, but different from those 
pursued by Dharmakīrti, which became authoritative in the Indo-Tibetan 
tradition. 
A slightly different tack is taken by Jakub Zamorski. Zamorski refrains 
from treating unparalleled Chinese ideas about Buddhist logic as prod-
ucts of “sinification”, suggesting that such interpretations might “reveal 
the inherent limitations of the system [Chinese scholars] were working 
within, rather than their own misunderstandings of this system”. 
Following Chmielewski and Harbsmeier, Zamorski argues that in fact, in 
some respects, Chinese syntax harboured the potential to clarify some 
logical issues, so that it did not necessarily function as a constraint on 
the understanding of Chinese thinkers. He concludes that “Chinese 
commentators were capable of clarifying some ambiguous aspects of the 
Indian ‘science of reasons’ (hetuvidyā).” 
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Several other studies demur from the models used by theorists of 
“sinification” in treating Chinese authors and thinkers as making deli-
berate and self-aware choices about the doctrinal directions they took, in 
ways that potentially cast light on the issues already inherent in their 
Indic source materials. 
For example, Yoke Meei Choong shows that Chinese scholiast monks 
were quite capable of picking and choosing among the sources available 
to them with acute critical acumen, and artfully spinning those sources 
in the service of their own doctrinal agendas. Choong carefully studies 
the intricate complexities of interpretation in a few short passages from 
the Vajracchedikā, in both Indian texts (mainly preserved in Chinese 
translation), and further Chinese commentaries. A picture emerges of 
Chinese authors not as dupes to Chinese cultural presuppositions, mis-
understanding Indic sources, but rather, as equal and sophisticated 
contributors to an ongoing, pan-Buddhist discussion about the most 
consequential questions in large doctrinal systems, engaging with de-
bates that were already conducted in similar terms between the Prajñā-
pāramitā literature itself and Yogācāra authors in India. 
Similarly, Hans-Rudolf Kantor’s study takes Chinese Buddhist think-
ers seriously as qualified and incisive contributors to the elucidation of 
fundamental doctrinal questions, focusing on what Kantor regards as a 
fundamental Buddhist problematic – the relation between reality and 
delusion, awakened and non-awakened mind – which cuts across large 
Mahāyāna doctrinal currents. At the outset of his study, Kantor explicitly 
brackets out all questions of whether or not Chinese texts and thinkers 
represented continuations or transformations of Indic positions. Rather, 
he approaches the texts on the assumption that they may be able to 
teach us profound lessons about Mahāyāna Buddhism – not “Indian” or 
“Chinese” Mahāyāna, but just Mahāyāna, pure and simple.  
Quite possibly, the results of Kantor’s approach speak for themselves. 
Following his medieval Chinese authors, Kantor argues that from a 
soteriological perspective, the Mahāyāna “ultimate” (whether we call it 
śūnyatā, nirvāṇa, tathatā, or a number of other names) is thoroughly inter-
woven with and interdependent upon the relative/conventional (saṃ-
sāra, ignorance, falsehood etc.), just as much as the reverse is also true. 
Insight into this interdependence has the power to transform the mun-
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dane world into an avenue, rather than a barrier, to liberation. Given 
that the notion of the dependence of the conditioned world upon the 
unconditioned, let alone the reverse, is sometimes presented as a typi-
cally “sinified” position, Kantor’s argument potentially has a more gen-
eral significance, implying that inflections upon common Buddhist prob-
lematics that have been regarded as typically Chinese do not demon-
strate that Chinese thinkers were prevented by their own cultural limits 
from accurately understanding Indian Buddhist systems. Rather, they 
may represent new and genuine insights into actual dimensions of those 
problematics, which may have been brought out less clearly by the treat-
ments they received in other parts of the Buddhist world. 
Zhihua Yao studies the Yogācāra understanding of emptiness. Yao 
takes this understanding to be more balanced than the interpretations of 
the Madhyamaka, which he claims can justly be characterized as “nihilis-
tic”. Although Yao himself does not address it from this angle, the prob-
lem he studies touches upon what some scholars have sometimes 
characterized as a basic distinction or difference in emphasis between 
Indian and Chinese Buddhism – where Indian Buddhism tends to be 
more apophatic, Chinese Buddhism tends to be more kataphatic. How-
ever, like other scholars in this volume, Yao tends to treat the positions 
in his Chinese source texts as authentic Indian positions, or coherent 
organic developments of Indian positions, even though the evidence for 
those positions happens to be preserved in Chinese. The case of the Fo-
xing lun/*Buddhadhātu-śāstra presents this problem particularly sharply 
(and the text is quite central to Yao’s argument, representing, for Yao, 
the best development of the position he wants to characterise as typic-
ally Yogācāra). As Yao himself mentions, some scholars have regarded 
this text as a Chinese composition. Yao, however, chooses to adhere to 
the traditional ascription of the text to Vasubandhu. He thereby demon-
strates the kind of difference that is made by such apparently technical 
questions of ascription, in considering matters related to common claims 
about the types of doctrine that most typically characterise “sinified” 
Buddhism. 
Some of the present studies also scrutinise Chinese texts in light of 
the possibility that they might record information transmitted orally to 
Chinese authors. This possibility should arguably be considered more 
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often, even in cases where Chinese texts record ideas or positions for 
which we have no extant Indic evidence. For example, Jakub Zamorski 
discusses the possibility that works by Xuanzang’s disciples could reflect 
information about the Dignāgan system of Buddhist logic transmitted in 
this manner. Indeed, Shoryu Katsura shows that Kuiji did in fact have a 
better knowledge of Dignāga’s apoha theory than previously thought. In 
this case, then, ideas outside translated texts must have made their way 
into the Chinese tradition (i.e. the works of Kuiji) via oral transmission 
by a known route – the teaching of Xuanzang. Similarly, Junjie Chu’s 
study of *avakāśadānāśraya shows that ideas of Indic provenance very 
probably did underlie discussions in the Cheng weishi lun (成唯識論) and 
Kuiji (but at the same time, that Kuiji’s discussion of *krāntāśraya also 
shows that not all this information is necessarily reliable). 
One of the original impulses behind this project was to do justice to 
the true diversity and heterogeneity of Buddhist thinking in China dur-
ing the sixth and seventh centuries. We have therefore used the device 
of tracing the reception and transformation of Indian elements more as a 
heuristic. We do not pretend thereby that this theme is somehow more 
central to the overall course of Buddhism in that period than other 
rubrics that might equally have been chosen. The original project plan 
provisionally divided the problem into three main strands, and the 
ultimate shape of this volume, we believe, can still be understood quite 
well in terms of those strands: (1) Buddhist logic and epistemology in 
China; (2) Buddhist developments in China and Korea falling under the 
broad head of “Yogācāra” (this category naturally overlaps somewhat 
with the first); and (3) other Indian elements in Chinese Buddhist sys-
tems. The selection of scholars for the project naturally also ensured that 
the center of gravity would be in Buddhist ideas, doctrines and texts. 
Beyond these common threads, however, the focus on the heteroge-
neity and complexity of the materials has meant that we have not 
striven to superimpose an artificial uniformity or unity on contributions 
to the project. For example, just as we have tried to avoid the pitfalls of a 
simplistic “sinification” paradigm, as explained above, we have equally 
tried to avoid sifting through the period for putative “origins of the 
schools” of Chinese Buddhism. We have preferred to think that often, 
equally valuable historical lessons can be learned by examining “roads 
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not taken” in the long-term historical trends of East Asian Buddhism as a 
whole; or by scrutinizing those respects in which Chinese Buddhism ap-
proaches its Indic predecessors and parallels most closely, rather than 
focusing exclusively on what is ostensibly most distinctive to China. 
Thus, without laying artificial claim to excessive thematic unison, the 
remainder of this introduction will introduce the papers in the volume 
in précis, and then allow the individual authors and papers to speak for 
themselves. 
Logic and epistemology 
Funayama Toru analyzes the term xianliang (現量) as a translation for 
Sanskrit pratyakṣa (“direct perception”). This translation is best known 
as that used by Xuanzang (玄奘, 600/602-664), but Xuanzang was not the 
first person to use this term. Xianliang is, strictly speaking, not a literal 
translation of pratyakṣa, and this opens up larger questions about how 
and why such Buddhist concepts might have changed in the transition to 
China. Funayama studies the historical situation both before and after 
Xuanzang’s adoption of the term, with special attention to some Chinese 
interpretations of xianliang in the post-Xuanzang period. After Xuanzang, 
as Funayama shows, Chinese scholar-monks analyzed the term xianliang 
using such terms of Sanskrit grammatical analysis as “tatpuruṣa com-
pound” (yishi shi 依士釋) and “karmadhāraya compound” (chiye shi 持業
釋). However, these interpretations differed significantly from those 
usual in Sanskrit. Funayama argues on this basis that during the Tang 
and the Ming, Chinese scholars began to develop distinctive Chinese in-
terpretations of the term, but that it is beside the point to ask whether 
such Chinese interpretations make sense from a Sanskrit point of view; 
we are better to consider these Chinese interpretations from the per-
spective of the Chinese language, in which light they look extremely at-
tractive. Thus, Funayama contends, it is almost meaningless to say that 
Chinese understandings of xianliang are “mistakes”. They are better re-
garded as a new type of development, and it is in this sense that we 
might productively think about the “sinification of Buddhist concepts”. 
Chen-kuo Lin presents a textual and doctrinal study of Jingying Hui-
yuan’s 淨影慧遠 (523-592) Essay on the Three Means of Valid Cognition (San 
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liang zhi yi 三量智義). Lin contends that we can fully understand the 
soteriological project at this early stage of Chinese Buddhist logico-‌
epistemology only in light of links between epistemology and meditation. 
Unlike Dignāga, who attempted to lay down logic and epistemology as 
the universal foundation for all Indian philosophical systems, Buddhist 
and non-Buddhist, Huiyuan rather attempts to demonstrate that episte-
mology is relative to the various stages of intellectual and spiritual culti-
vation. Everything, including cognition, is condition-dependent: as the 
path of mental cultivation progresses, perception differs from beginner 
to advanced practitioner; and so too for inference; and for authoritative 
teaching (Huiyuan’s three pramāṇas). Thus, for Huiyuan, pramāṇas are 
indeed instruments to soteriological ends, and cannot be taken as autono-
mous domains and universal disciplines. For Lin, this means that Hui-
yuan is faithful to the authentic intent of Indian Buddhist epistemology. 
Lin also discusses a striking peculiarity in Huiyuan’s theory of knowledge, 
namely, his use of a pair of sinitic notions, “principle” (li 理) and “phe-
nomenon/phenomena” (shi 事), to develop the pre-Dignāgan theory of 
pramāṇa. Huiyuan uses li to refer to the “universal” (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) and 
shi to refer to the “particular” (svalakṣaṇa), adopting these ontological 
concepts to stand in for the Indic notions of paramārtha and saṃvṛti. 
Huiyuan’s application of this hermeneutics of li and shi to the epistemo-
logical enterprise might appear to constitute a classic proof-case for the 
theory of sinification: Huiyuan might easily be regarded as simply look-
ing at Indic materials through a sinitic lens. However, Lin concludes that 
a better interpretation might understand that Huiyuan’s interpretation 
operates dialectically, that is to say, such transformations as it might 
affect in the Indian concepts at issue also redound to reframe the seman-
tics of li and shi in the terms of an Indian Buddhist epistemological con-
text.  
Shoryu Katsura discusses little-studied materials reflecting Chinese 
understandings of Dignāga’s (Chenna 陳那 ca. 480-530) apoha theory 
(i.e. his theory of meaning). Given that Yijing’s (義淨, 635-713) transla-
tion of Dignāga’s masterwork, the Pramāṇasamuccaya (Ji liang lun 集量論) 
and its accompanying Svavṛtti, did not survive, it has been easy for 
modern scholars to assume that classical Chinese Buddhist scholars did 
not know apoha theory. However, Kuiji (窺基, 632-682), Xuanzang’s 
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direct disciple, refers to apoha in his Cheng weishi lun shuji (成唯識論述
記). Katsura shows that Kuiji knows that there are two means of valid 
cognition (liang 量): perception (xianliang 現量), taking as its object the 
particular characteristic (zixiang 自相); and inference (biliang 比量), 
taking the general characteristic (gongxiang 共相). Further, Kuiji defines 
the general characteristic as “exclusion of others” (zheyu 遮餘), and 
says that both types of conceptual cognition, namely, inference and 
verbal cognition, take this general characteristic as object by “exclusion 
of others”. This makes the exclusion of others the nature and function of 
conceptual cognition in general. Moreover, only this general character-
istic can be expressed verbally; the particular characteristic (the object 
itself) is beyond the reach of conceptual cognition, and cannot be ex-
pressed by verbal designation (yanshuo 言説). However, in an interest-
ing development, Kuiji holds that even the general characteristic cannot 
ultimately be expressed by any verbal designation. Katsura observes that 
this idea might not have been endorsed by Dignāga and other Indian 
Buddhist logicians, but points out a similar development in the late work 
of Jñānaśrīmitra. Finally, Katsura shows that another possible new 
development in Kuiji is his understanding that the distinction between 
particular and universal is relative, just as in the hierarchy of the Vai-
śeṣika categories. This understanding, again, might not have been en-
dorsed by Dignāga, for whom only universal characteristics are relative 
to each other and constitute a hierarchy. 
Shinya Moriyama examines Kuiji’s (窺基) commentary on Śaṅkara-
svāmin’s Nyāyapraveśa(ka), which had the greatest impact on the later 
development of Chinese and Japanese hetuvidyā. Moriyama examines 
Kuiji’s peculiar interpretations of the topic of the antinomic reason (vi-
ruddhāvyabhicārin). This is a type of fallacy that takes the unique position 
of fulfilling the triple characteristics of a valid reason (trairūpya, 因三
相); what makes it invalid, rather than its internal structure, is the fact 
that it contradicts other presuppositions in the declared position of its 
proponent. Moriyama argues that contrary to expectation, Kuiji under-
stands very well the background of this category in the vāda-tradition of 
debate, and correctly sees its practical significance in various debates 
among Buddhist insiders, such as debates on “non-manifested matter” 
(avijñaptirūpa) between a Sarvāstivādin and a Mahāyāna Buddhist. How-
 Introduction 25 
 
ever, Moriyama also shows that on the whole, Kuiji’s interpretation of 
the category seems to reflect a complex mix of insight, original thought, 
and misunderstanding of Indian ideas; and in particular, that Kuiji seems 
in fact to construct a new set of rules for debate, which seem to be moti-
vated in part by the particular exigencies of a proof given by Xuanzang 
for consciousness-only. Thus, this example in Kuiji’s thought shows that 
the dynamics at work in the production of distinctive East Asian 
interpretations of Buddhist ideas can be complex, and irreducible to 
simplistic models. 
Jakub Zamorski analyzes a chapter in the history of the so-called “sci-
ence of reasons” (hetuvidyā, yinming 因明) with significance for the 
comparative study of logic. Both of the Indian hetuvidyā treatises trans-
lated into Chinese by Xuanzang in the seventh century contain examples 
of fallacious statements which are untenable on logical grounds alone, 
and therefore unacceptable as topics of debate, regardless of the 
philosophical affiliation of the disputant and opponent. Zamorski argues 
that all Chinese (and other East Asian) commentators regarded these two 
sentences as examples of one and the same fallacy, which they followed 
the Nyāyapraveśa in labeling “opposition to one’s own words” (svavacana-
viruddha). Primarily through the analysis of three Tang commentaries, 
Zamorski argues that Chinese authors achieved genuine original contri-
butions to the issue of self-refutation, of significance to the history of 
logic even in a broad historical perspective reaching beyond China; but 
at the same time, that the arguments of these authors also reveal some 
peculiarities of a “sinified” understanding of the hetuvidyā system.  
Yogācāra ideas and authors 
Ching Keng’s paper challenges the prevalent assumption that the Awak-
ening of Faith was composed under the influence of the Dilun School. 
Keng aims to show that in the representative works of Huiyuan, arguably 
the most important Dilun master, we do not find the essential doctrinal 
feature of the Awakening of Faith, namely, the compromise or even the 
total obliteration of the distinction between unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) 
and conditioned (saṃskṛta) dharmas. Keng observes that almost all avail-
able studies of Huiyuan focus on a small piece entitled “Bashi yi” (八識義, 
26 Radich and Lin  
 
“On the Meaning of the Eight Consciousnesses”), which shows strong 
influence from the Awakening of Faith; but that other works of Huiyuan 
outline a very different conceptual scheme. Taking these other works as 
representing Huiyuan’s earlier thought, and therefore Dilun thought, 
Keng argues that the hallmark of Huiyuan’s thought is a dualist scheme, 
in which the inherently pure aspect is unambiguously unconditioned, 
with no blending with conditioned dharmas; this inherently pure aspect 
can adjust to falsity (suiwang 隨妄) and give rise to misconception, but 
without compromising its unconditioned nature. Upon this basis, Keng 
contends that the compromise between unconditioned and conditioned 
in the Awakening of Faith should be regarded as an innovation, rather 
than a direct outgrowth from Dilun thought. An important broader 
implication of Keng’s argument is that Huiyuan’s thought, Dilun thought, 
and even the thought of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra has been anachronistically 
misinterpreted through the later, typically Chinese lens of the Awakening 
of Faith. This suggests the sobering possibility that typically “sinitic” (or 
even “sinified”) developments became so pervasive in the later East 
Asian tradition that their stamp may still lie heavy upon parts of modern 
Buddhology itself, and that we might therefore overlook both evidence 
and products of “sinifying” processes, and even the actual features of 
Indic materials. 
Charles Muller presents a full annotated translation of Jingying Hui-
yuan’s (淨影慧遠, 523–592) Erzhang yi (二障義, “System of the Two 
Hindrances”), accompanied by a lengthy introduction to the major issues 
surrounding the two hindrances, and the role played by Huiyuan in 
defining their future course. Muller situates this work in a broad current 
in Buddhism, especially its meditative forms, whereby it pays unique at-
tention, among religious traditions, to the psychological aspect of hu-
man problems, and distinguishes to an unusual degree between the cate-
gories of emotional and cognitive in the analysis of such problems. Mul-
ler argues that the general patterns of this distinction are discernible in 
early Buddhism, and become clearer in Abhidharmic scholasticism; but 
that it is only with the maturation of the Mahāyāna that afflictive and 
cognitive obstacles to liberation are formally organized under the ru-
brics of the two hindrances – the afflictive hindrances (kleśa-āvaraṇa 煩惱
障, 煩惱惑) and the cognitive hindrances (jñeya-āvaraṇa; 智障, 智惑, 
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所知障). Against some discussion in modern scholarship that has tended 
to cast the pair as a fundamentally Yogācāra construction, Muller con-
tends that a significant portion of their development – at least in East 
Asia – occurred in the works of Dilun or Tathāgatagarbha scholars. This 
is exemplified by Huiyuan’s essay, which subsequently deeply informed 
later work on the hindrances by the Silla scholiast Wonhyo (元曉, 617–
686), and even the interpretations of the Chinese Weishi school by such 
figures as Kuiji (窺基, 632–682).  
Junjie Chu presents a close analysis of a passage in Xuanzang’s Cheng 
weishi lun discussing the term kaidaoyi (開導依). The text presents three 
different opinions concerning the interpretation of this special term. 
Chu’s main aim is to examine the meaning of the two elements in the 
term, namely kaidao and yi, with reference to their possible origins in 
both Abhidharma and Yogācāra Indian sources. He argues that kaidaoyi 
reflects an alternate name for the concept of the samanantarapratyaya, 
viz. *avakāśadānāśraya (widely used both Abhidharma and Yogācāra), re-
ferring to the awareness that has passed away in the immediate antece-
dent moment, called “mind”, which has the function of giving way so 
that the subsequent awareness can arise. This shows that kaidaoyi cannot 
be a translation of the Sanskrit word *krāntāśraya, as Kuiji’s phonetic 
transcription jielanduo (羯爛多) suggests. Chu also studies the informa-
tion given in the Cheng weishi lun about controversies between three dif-
ferent interpretations of the function and nature of this *avakāśa-
dānāśraya. In so doing, he shows that the Chinese texts of Xuanzang and 
his disciples preserve important information that can cast fresh light on 
key terms in Indian systems. 
Zhihua Yao’s paper sets out from the observation that due to the pre-
valent influence of Madhyamaka philosophy, the paradigm of the two 
truths has become a convenient way to characterize the Buddhist ap-
proach to reality. Yao argues that this two-tiered paradigm contributed 
to a great extent to a view of the world as fundamentally illusory, to 
which the majority of Mādhyamikas subscribe. He contrasts this with the 
Yogācāra theory of the three natures, which he contends was intended 
to improve on this two-tiered paradigm, and restore a more robust and 
holistic worldview. To this end, Yao examines scattered sources from 
Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu, and seeks to analyze their 
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criticisms of the Madhyamaka version of the two truths on the basis of 
the Yogācāra theory of the three natures. Yao’s study thus aims to cor-
rect misconceptions concerning the Buddhist approach to reality among 
contemporary scholars, who he argues have fallen under the influence of 
Madhyamaka; and to champion a Yogācāra perspective that he regards 
as more plausible and fruitful. 
Other Indian ideas 
Hans-Rudolf Kantor presents a philosophical and comparative analysis of 
various constructivist approaches to the problem of “mind and con-
sciousness” (xinshi 心識), developed by sixth-century Chinese Buddhists 
in debates based on the Indian Mahāyāna scriptures and treatises avail-
able to them. The paper falls into two parts. First, Kantor discusses a 
selection of influential Chinese Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, and Tathāgata-
garbha sources translated from Sanskrit between the fifth and seventh 
centuries. Kantor then focuses on the varying interpretations of the 
ideas in those sources propounded by Chinese Dilun, Tiantai, and Huayan 
masters. For Kantor, all the Mahāyāna texts he discusses stress that 
“mind and consciousness” must be discussed on the basis of the insight 
that “truth and falsehood are inseparable”, as they pertain to the way we 
relate to and exist in our world. In other words, Kantor contends, all 
these discussions feature in common a key coincidence of epistemologi-
cal and ontological issues, even as each presents a different view on the 
nature of “mind and consciousness”. 
Chien-hsing Ho studies Jizang’s (吉藏, 549−623) Chinese Madhyamaka 
philosophy of ontic indeterminacy. On this view, all things are empty of 
determinate form or nature: given any thing x, no linguistic item can 
truly and conclusively be applied to x, in the sense of positing in it some 
determinate form or nature. This ontic indeterminacy is closely con-
nected with Jizang’s notion of the Way (dao 道) – also termed the correct 
Way (zhengdao 正道) or the Real (shixiang 實相) – which Ho sees as 
indicating a kind of ineffable principle of reality. However, even as he 
thus propounds a “Way”, which in other hands refers to a kind of meta-
physical ultimate, Jizang also equates the Way with nonacquisition, as a 
conscious state of freedom from any attachment or conception what-
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soever. Ho therefore considers the question: Does Jizang’s notion of the 
Way indicate some metaphysical principle or reality? Or is it actually a 
skillful expedient designed to lead us to the consummate state of com-
plete spiritual freedom? Ho argues that Jizang does not clearly posit any 
nonempty metaphysical reality or principle. Jizang does speak of the 
Way as nonempty (as well as empty), but Ho interprets this as aiming to 
highlight the claim that the Way cannot be determined as empty, or re-
duced to emptiness. Nonetheless, for Ho, Jizang’s Way is not any reality 
metaphysically higher than the myriad things (wanwu 萬物); it is no-
thing more than the ineffable, indeterminable, nondual quiescence 
wherein both oneself and (the myriad) external things are conceptually 
undifferentiated. In light of Jizang’s debt to Sengzhao (僧肇, 374?−414), 
Ho argues that this Way qua quiescence is only revealed in nonconcep-
tual experience, which entails a state of forgetting speech and cessation 
of thought (yan wang lü jue 言忘慮絕), and harbors within itself the myr-
iad things in their undifferentiated state. The Way is thus beyond con-
ceptual determination and attachment, and so accessible only to a mind 
of nonacquisition (wude 無得); it is therefore realized only when one’s 
mind ceases to approach things in a spirit of acquisition (youde 有得). 
Yoke Meei Choong studies various interpretations of the “parable of 
the raft” in an early canonical sūtra of the Majjhima-nikāya (and parallel 
Chinese Āgamas), which appears again in the Vajracchedikā, focusing on 
discussions of the terms dharma and adharma in both Indian commen-
taries (mainly preserved in Chinese translation) and Chinese authors and 
commentators. She shows that key textual variants are distributed in a 
complex pattern through both translations and commentaries, in both 
Indian and Chinese texts. Her careful analysis shows that all texts con-
taining the variant readings contain Yogācāra thought, and thus, that 
the variants probably stemmed from Yogācāra circles in India. Moreover, 
the diverse interpretations of the term adharma, in particular, differenti-
ate themselves along the lines of sectarian divisions between Mādhya-
mika and Yogācāra authors. This sectarian coloring of interpretation 
continues in China, where Zhiyi and Jizang explain the root text’s notion 
of “abandoning adharma” to mean the abandonment of even the ultimate 
reality, that is, non-existence, whereas Kuiji follows Vasubandhu and 
interprets the notion to refer to the denial of the non-existence of the 
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ultimate truth. Thus, the Chinese commentators accept the ideas in 
Asaṅga’s and Vasubandhu’s commentaries only selectively, depending 
upon their own doctrinal preferences; and the fact that Jizang aligns 
himself more closely with Asaṅga on several points shows, interestingly 
enough, that Asaṅga’s interpretation was more acceptable to the Chinese 
Mādhyamikas. As already discussed above, these subtly nuanced choices 
on the part of Chinese commentators clearly show them to be aware and 
insightful contributors to a debate continuous with concerns that were 
also vital in India. 
Michael Radich attempts to provide a fresh perspective on fifth- and 
sixth-century debates in the Chinese Buddhist world about whether or 
not some part of the sentient being does or does not survive death, to 
transmigrate and reap karmic rewards. Chinese Buddhist thinkers argued, 
against their non-Buddhist opponents, that something does survive 
death. Seen against the background of normative Indian Buddhism, this 
turn of events has struck scholars as odd and even heretical (as a kind of 
“ātmavāda”); unsurprisingly, then, the debate and its fruits have often 
been regarded as evidence of the supposed “sinification” of Buddhist 
ideas. Radich suggests that this way of reading the debates is probably 
misleading. A significant thread running through Buddhist contributions 
to these debates is the use of terms meaning “consciousness” (esp. equi-
valents to Skt. vijñāna) for the transmigrating entity, and Radich aims to 
show that the uses of vijñāna in this debate have a longer prehistory in 
China than has usually been recognized, and ultimately, can be traced in 
part to a minority strand of ideas in Indic traditions. The center of 
Radich’s study is a new interpretation of Liang Wudi’s (梁武帝, r. 502-549) 
Shenming cheng fo yi (神明成佛義) and its relation to its scriptural 
sources and intellectual-historical context. This study is intended as part 
of a larger project examining possible antecedents to Paramārtha’s 
(Zhendi 真諦, 499-569) doctrine of *amalavijñāna (amoluoshi 阿摩羅識, 
“taintless consciousness”). As such, this paper attempts to contribute to 
a larger reconsideration of outdated interpretations of the development 
of Chinese Buddhist doctrine in terms of “sinification”, by arguing that 
continuities with Indian materials often prove on closer scrutiny to be 
greater than scholars have sometimes thought. 
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On the basis of the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra, Michael Zimmermann stud-
ies two different models of Buddha-nature in Indian sources, both of 
which can be read into the Sanskrit term tathāgatagarbha: a theory of 
disclosure, and a theory of development. The disclosure model is built on 
the idea that living beings already carry within themselves a full-fledged 
Buddha, whose efficacy has only to be disclosed, without any essential 
modification of the living being. The developmental model, by contrast, 
perceives this Buddha-element in sentient beings as something which 
has to be nourished and can transform into full buddhahood only after a 
process of development. Over the course of subsequent centuries, Zim-
mermann contends, these two models became two prototypes of the 
theory of Buddha-nature, and influenced the intellectual history of the 
spread of Buddha-nature teaching throughout Central and East Asia. 
Zimmermann argues that at the early stage of Buddha-nature thought in 
India, the authors of the texts obviously had no intention to promote 
their message along philosophically refined lines, but rather, seem main-
ly to have aimed to spread the idea that all sentient beings have the 
potential to become a Buddha, by arguing that sentient beings carry all 
they need for that end within themselves, albeit hidden and unknown to 
themselves; the texts also do not outline concrete modes of practice by 
which this aim can be realized. 
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